“You‟re not only wrong. You‟re wrong at the top of your voice.”
- John J. Macreedy (Spencer Tracy), "Bad Day at Black Rock‟.
The seemingly vampiric permanence of the investment banking survivors versus their peers in hedge funds, property or private equity suggests, as one correspondent posits, that “the end result is going to be very messy”. While Lehman was Wall Street‟s singular blood offering, what will it take to put a stake through the heart of rejuvenated risk-mongering ? The Financial Times last week carried a refreshingly outspoken interview with Paul Purcell (brother of Morgan Stanley‟s Philip) who laid the blame for the financial crisis on “the greed of fixed-income people”: “Go back and look at the history of Wall Street – Drexel Burnham, Salomon Brothers, Kidder Peabody, Bear Stearns, Long-Term Capital Management, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch – the fixed-income guys blow up every firm.” On first sight this seems perverse, given the tendency of bonds as a whole to be largely mundane investments, seemingly offering little by way of either return or risk. But once you add leverage to the mix, in order to generate those super-sized profits (and bonuses), all becomes clear. Mr. Purcell continues to take Wall Street to task: “We [investment bank RW Baird] didn‟t do the bad things that the rest of Wall Street did. The difference is we actually take care of our clients. We want to make money for people. The big firms created proprietary product they put through their own distribution systems to make them more money, whether the clients needed the product or not. Our business is to sell people the right product at the right time for the right price.” Which sounds fair enough; the problem being, says Mr. Purcell, in the “75% of the people in our business [who] are not honest.”
The problem with Wall Street, other than systemic dishonesty, would seem to be that it simply cannot be “right-sized”. (Or that the only “right” size is, erm, zero.) Fundamental overcapacity during the boom led to an arms race of competitive risk-taking; the „nuclear winter‟ compression of capacity in the brokerage industry has only led to expansion in bid-offer spreads and inflated margins for players that don‟t even deserve to be in the game. If only government treated infrastructure or education with the cowed awe it dispenses to banks, imagine what society might be capable of.
Time, perhaps, to shift focus from an irredeemable „sell side‟ to a now comparatively overpopulated and continually dysfunctional „buy side‟ – the motley universe of asset managers. Notwithstanding last year‟s annus horribilis, David Swensen, manager of the Yale Endowment, has written nicely of the characteristics which should be sought out in fund management counterparties:
“Attractive investment management organisations encourage decisions directed toward creating investment returns, not toward generating fee income for the manager. Such principal-oriented advisers tend to be small, entrepreneurial and independent.. Entrepreneurial capitalism constitutes a behavioural process with three driving forces: innovation, ownership and adaptation. Each characteristic contributes to the core of successful money management organisations.” (David Swensen, „Pioneering Portfolio Management‟, Free Press.)
In essence, the buy side world would seem to be polarised between institutional heavyweights with heft in assets under management (ordinarily an ultimate handicap to performance) and individuals within boutiques.
To quote Swensen again: “In selecting external managers, investors attempt to identify individuals committed to placing institutional goals ahead of personal self-interest. Alignment of interest occurs most frequently in independent investment management firms run in an entrepreneurial fashion by energetic, intelligent, ethical professionals. Engaging investment advisers involves consequences beyond issues of financial returns, as fiduciaries entrust both the institution‟s assets and reputation to the external management firm.”
While it may well be psychologically difficult for the client to embrace, a degree of contrarianism is also a prerequisite: “Without creative portfolio choices, investment managers face dismal prospects since the old combination represents the consensus view. Market efficiency drives returns on market-like portfolios to the average, causing conventional portfolios with conventional ideas to produce conventional results, a poor outcome for active investment managers.”
All of which may assist those leafing through the roughly 8,500 funds listed in the Financial Times‟ managed funds section in search of inspiration. The figure is a pure guesstimate on my part, and the fonts for some fund names were so small I started worrying about my eyesight. (That also presumes that what those searchers are looking for actually exists, which is a moot point.) |
